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The League of the South (USA) and Lega Nord (Italy), formed in 1994 and 1991 respectively, are
nationalist organizations that have utilized claims to Celtic ethnicity to further their appeal. In this
article we explore these claims, made in relation to the southern United States and northern Italy, and
argue that they are used by these organizations to justify exclusionary politics. By claiming a
privileged status for Celtic culture, heritage and genealogy, the League of the South and Lega Nord
envision their putative nation-states as accommodating other ethnic groups in subordinate roles. We
argue that claiming Celtic ethnicity is an implicit appeal to white privilege. In the proposed nation-
states of the Confederate States of America and Padania, white authority would be sustained. Further,
the way these groups use Celticness allows them to make links to specific historical and material
geographies. Claiming Celtic origins enables northern Italians to distinguish themselves from
southern Italians, and to make an associated historical-geographical connection between themselves
and northern Europe, enabling disassociation from the Mediterranean. The League of the South claim
to ‘Anglo-Celtic’ ethnicity enables their membership to distinguish themselves from other residents of
the United States, be these non-white residents of the southern states or other white people within
the USA. Finally, we suggest that some dominant political commitments to multiculturalism facilitate
precisely such claims to Celtic origins, however tenuous, to be made in the name of recognizing and
protecting cultural difference.
On 18 September 2000 the Guardian newspaper in the UK contained articles abouttwo nationalist organizations that emerged in the 1990s, the Lega Nord (LN) in Italy
and the League of the South (LS) in the US.1 There were several reasons for this press
coverage. A week previously, the League of the South had been identified as a ‘hate
group’ and part of a ‘neo-Confederate movement, increasingly rife with white
supremacists and racist ideology [that] is growing across America’.2 The Lega Nord
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had decided to re-establish a political alliance with the centre-right coalition for the May
2001 Italian general election, a somewhat surprising move because in 1994 the Lega
Nord had left Silvio Berlusconi’s short-lived governing coalition, causing its collapse.3
Despite differences between the Lega Nord and League of the South, the former being
part of the Italian government and the latter a fringe organization without elected
officials, both movements share similarities and, recognizing these, have established
formal connections. Such sentiments resulted in a joint conference between the leading
members of the Lega Nord and the League of the South at Lake Como, Italy, in May
2000. In 1996, a director of the League of the South explained the ties between the two
groups:
The Southern League [League of the South]4 has more in common with Italy’s Lega Nord (Northern League)
than just a name. Umberto Bossi and his followers cherish the same dreams of limited self-government
advocated by the League, and they are making a determined effort to take back control of their lives, their
culture, and their heritage from a corrupt central government.5
This paper examines the League of the South and makes preliminary comparisons with
the Lega Nord as these two contemporary nationalist movements emerged at similar
times with analogous proposals for the establishment of independent nation-states. We
argue that recognition by the Lega Nord that Celtic origins are central to their proposed
nation of Padania correlates with the demands for an ‘Anglo-Celtic’6 Confederate States
of America (CSA) suggested by the League of the South. The respective assertions of
Celtic heritage arguably comprise attempts to recruit support and legitimate political
demands for secession.
A comparison between the LS and the LN is illuminating, as it affords the opportunity
to consider how such organizations are using appeals to cultural protection and
difference to bolster claims that they represent a distinct ethnic group deserving of self-
determination and an independent nation-state. Located within different geographical
and political contexts, the League of the South and Lega Nord both developed their
strategies of appealing to Celtic culture within currently popular inclusionary discourses
of multiculturalism. Although the political project and discourse of multiculturalism
varies over time and space, in US and many European discourses of multiculturalism
one of the base tenets is an essentialized understanding of culture.7 People are
envisioned by policy-makers as belonging to singular and bounded cultures and,
consequently, supposed cultural differences become the basis for the evaluation of all
difference, and hence constitute the defining component of entitlement to status and
authority. This becomes a way of writing ethnicities and cultures as the fundamental
bases of contemporary Western society, typically eliding other structuring elements
such as gender, sexuality and class. It also demands that claims to political power and
legitimacy can only be made through appeals to cultural distinction and an assertion
that one culture is as valid and worthy of status as any other. Consequently, material
geographies of power become structured by such cultural claims as activists justify their
control of resources through symbolic geographies of culture and ethnicity. The results
are current Western political conceptualizations of multiculturalism that try to balance
recognition of cultural distinction with a commitment to the commensurability of all
cultures:
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multiculturalism’s simultaneous assertion of the right to be different and to be treated equally is inherently
problematic. It can also be in tension, if not contradiction, with the central tenets of liberal democracy.8
It is this point of tension within current liberal democratic practices of multiculturalism
in Western Europe and the United States that members of groups like the LS and LN can
exploit. By appealing to cultural distinction and the right to be different, they can
demand that the people they represent deserve what they envision as protection from
cultural erasure and homogenization. Typically, claims to culture are increasingly used
by groups to assert rights to political power or maintain their privileged status within
the existing political economic system.9 In contrast, as nationalist organizations, the LS
and LN appeal is not confined to extant structural relationships. Rather, the LS and LN
want to impose new political and economic relations by establishing new nation-states.
In these independent nation-states, authority to empower people will rest within new
political structures. In Padania and the CSA, therefore, LN and LS supporters would
establish themselves as the dominant group; and, as we demonstrate below, those
cultural groups conceived of as having different ethnic ancestries from those of the
ruling class would be subordinate.
The LS and LN exploit a version of popular sentiment that envisions a direct
relationship between culture and territory, with each ethnic culture retaining a priori a
right to possession of a particular territory which constitutes a bounded homeland.10
Articulating cultural distinction is, therefore, one of the symbolic and discursive
strategies through which nationalist activists recruit followers and demand the power to
control certain demarcated territories. LS and LN claims to Celtic ancestries and
proposals to disaffiliate from the United States and Italy and establish independent
nation-states may appear far-fetched. Yet our comparison, focusing on each organiza-
tion’s appeals to Celtic origins, demonstrates how political activists are appropriating
cultural identity as a basis for repositioning their claims to ethnic authority and control
over territory.
Why Celtic? Why now?
‘Celtic identity politics’, argue Harvey et al ., experienced an ‘energisation’ in the late
twentieth century, primarily in the British Isles, where successful Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish campaigns for devolution generated a restructuring of British political
and institutional relationships.11 Celticity, Harvey et al . proceed to remark, comprises
an attractive set of symbols and identities that come replete with popular recognition
and a supposedly ancient past that can be invoked by people for many purposes, from
‘new age’ religion to popular ‘world music’.12 Through interest in genealogy and the
marketing of popular Celtic culture, Celticity was exported beyond the British Isles.
Two areas in which nationalist activists pursued interest in Celtic cultural identity were
the southern United States and northern Italy, locations not usually associated with
Celtic separatism.
The very flexibility of Celticity and the vagaries of archaeological evidence regarding
the original Celts enable multiple political and cultural meanings to be invested in the
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term, whilst retaining both the symbolic value and historical authority accrued by
reference to a supposedly ancient Celtic culture. As Chapman and James have
demonstrated, Celtic culture and identity has problematic historical foundations.13
Since the eighteenth century, the archaeological record has been interpreted as
evidence for ‘a prehistoric Celtic commonwealth stretching from Scotland to Portugal
and Turkey’, and confirmation of a singular, pan-European, Celtic culture.14 Such a
reading, although popular and commonly reiterated, is founded upon simplistic
assessments of burial styles and metal working designs, and on an assumption of
cultural uniformity over time and space in the Bronze and Iron Ages. Indeed,
Trumpener explains that at least since the mid-eighteenth century, claiming Celtic
origins has enabled people ‘to fabricate whatever version of the past seemed nationally
expedient’.15 Despite such flexibility, Celts are commonly envisioned as white people,
coming from areas of northern and central Europe that are historically associated with
white populations. This racialization of Celtic identity, discussed below, is another
component enhancing the desirability of Celtic culture for the Lega Nord and League of
the South.
Although Celtic history is disputed, its geographies are less malleable. Territory
associated with Celtic inhabitants is generally agreed to be European, and is most
commonly associated with the non-English areas of the British Isles, namely Ireland,
Scotland, Wales and the Isle of Man. The south-western English county of Cornwall is
also often included in popular accounts of areas inhabited by Celts. Other regions
include Brittany in France and Galicia in northern Spain.16 These predominantly
northern European geographies locate Celtic peoples and culture within the territories
of modern dominant political and cultural powers. They are also areas of Europe that
have long been seen as occupied by white populations.17 Further, in the 1990s, the
context of developing a single European market and political community led to
attempts to establish Celts as a pan-European people and an ancient example of
European political and economic unification.18 These efforts were focused on the
exhibition The Celts: the origins of Europe , which ran from March to December 1991 in
the Palazzo Grassi, Venice. A massive catalogue for this exhibition contained essays that
recognize Celtic peoples and culture in Europe extending from the Atlantic coasts of
Ireland and northern Spain, to Poland, the Balkans, Greece and Turkey.19 The volume
also identified a revival of interest in Celtic culture and archaeology within Italy in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, precisely the period in which immigrants first arrived in Italy
in significant numbers.20
In the United States, the meaning of Celtic culture and identity has undergone a
transformation in the 1990s, becoming a hugely popular commercial product. An
association of Ireland with political conflict, Casey argues, has been replaced by a
‘barrage of Irishness on supermarket shelves’, and an image of fun and revelry
appealing to an estimated market of 40 million consumers.21 A similar transformation
has occurred with Scottishness, not least due to the success of the 1995 film
Braveheart .22 In the 1980 US Census, Scottish ethnic ancestry was ‘very unpopular’,
but two decades later Diane Roberts contended that Scottish culture had ‘muscl[ed]
Irishness out of the way as the Celtic flavor du jour ’ in the USA.23 With the growing
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popularity of Irish pubs, Celtic music and films like Braveheart , identification with Celts
is arguably at an all-time high in the United States.
Such strong assertions of Celtic ancestors is a recent phenomenon in the USA, where
in the nineteenth century popular culture deplored the Irish in particular as members of
a distinct and inferior Celtic race. Celtic identity ‘became white’, losing its prior
ascription as a subordinate cultural and racial identity, as Celtic immigrants assimilated
into mainstream US political and economic structures and were replaced as low-wage
labour by African-Americans moving north and into factories in the early twentieth
century.24 Irish culture and ethnicity in the United States, Arndorfer argues, is a product
of an ‘[u]nspoken but always understood . . . contrast . . . with that other major, if more
threatening, exotic group in the United States: African-Americans’. Such assessments
lead Hague to argue that for some adherents in the United States ‘Celtic’ culture is
synonymous with ‘white racial identity’.25
Celtic identity and multiculturalism
Current claims to Celtic culture and identity by the LS and LN operate within a
contemporary political climate which advocates multiculturalism as the basis of Western
democracies at the start of the twenty-first century. Multiculturalism can, therefore, be
recognized as a discourse and political commitment that developed in a specific
historical context. Stephen Castles, amongst others, argues that political discourses and
struggles about multiculturalism are thus intertwined with late-twentieth-century
practices of immigration and processes of social and economic restructuring. These
trends are reshaping institutional structures such as the state, national community and
supposedly homogeneous cultural traditions.26 Within these processes, Castles main-
tains, immigrants and ethnic minorities defend themselves against racism and margin-
alization originating within the host society / typically from those residents most
affected by these restructuring processes, who are predominantly male and white / by
asserting their ‘right to cultural difference’ within a multicultural population.27 This
leads to appeals by the marginalized for authorities to recognize, protect and respect
cultural differences. LS and LN appeals to Celtic ancestry, made within this
contemporary political context of multiculturalism and recognition of cultural
difference, are, however, partially a nativist response to immigration and shifting
structures of political power. For example:
The Southern League [League of the South] envisions a South where our borders are sealed against massive
Third World immigration; a South where the interests of the core population of Anglo-Celts is protected
from the ravages of so-called multi-culturalism and diversity; a South where a prosperous and self-confident
European majority can welcome into its ranks on its own terms productive and sympathetic members of
other nations and cultures.28
The ‘right to cultural difference’ is, in the case of the League of the South, asserted as a
reaction against multiculturalism, yet the LS utilize rhetoric of cultural protection to
justify their political demands. Arguing that proponents of ‘Anglo-Celtic’ culture have
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been too timid in the face of multiculturalist doctrines, LS president James Michael Hill
identifies the need to reassert their ‘Anglo-Celtic’ culture as the most significant part of
the landscape:
The multicultural diversity crowd has thus far managed to cow us into apologetics or outright silence.
Presently, our Anglo-Celtic Southern culture and its history, heroes, songs, symbols, and banners are under
attack, and their defence could serve as our immediate rallying point . . . Only if we know who we are and
whence we have come can we hope to survive and prosper as a distinct people.29
In some contexts, therefore, the tensions within multiculturalist ideology between
recognizing difference and safeguarding cultures can become a justification for
segregationist sentiment, as the League of the South make clear:
The League of the South upholds the right of free association. Peoples of different cultures should pursue
their own interests without interference from bureaucrats and social engineers who push such enormities as
global democracy and multiculturalism.30
The integrationist rationale of multiculturalism is envisioned by the LS (and the LN) to
threaten the distinct cultural practices that proponents envision as defining their group
identity. Such segregationist assertions of ‘distinct people’ and ‘own interests’ can be
exploited by activists who demand the return to prior structural conditions in which
their group enjoyed political supremacy and power, implicitly calling for the
disempowerment of those whom they perceive to be benefiting from current
multiculturalist practices. To achieve this desired goal, and with it their supposedly
rightful status of dominance, both the LS and LN propose secession and the
establishment of independent nation-states. Recognizing current political discourses,
both the LS and LN demand that Celtic culture, and by extension the culture of those
with Celtic ethnicity and ancestry, should be self-determined. This ‘right to cultural
difference’ for the LS and LN becomes a basis upon which wider political strategies can
be founded. A claim of right to self-determination for those exhibiting Celtic ethnicity is
for LS and LN activists a claim to power, territory and control. Exploiting the tensions
between multiculturalist recognitions of difference and commitments to sustaining a
multiplicity of cultures, the LS and LN use Celtic ethnicity as a strategy to broaden their
potential audience, widen their appeal and assert their cultural right to power. The
result, as we demonstrate here, is ‘a politics of separatism’.31
Multiculturalism and whiteness
In the 1990s the activists who founded the League of the South and Lega Nord were
able, we suggest, to assert their recovered Celtic origins because of the discursive
resources made available by the growing popularity of Celtic-themed popular culture,
mainstream political commitments to multiculturalism and the resurgence of nationalist
separatisms in post-Soviet Eastern Europe. Celtic culture, long incorporated into
whiteness in the United States, could be appropriated and reinscribed as a progressive
cultural identity / equivalent to established European nationalist groups in Scotland,
Ireland and Wales, while allowing implicit appeals to white superiority to remain
156
Euan Hague, Benito Giordano and Edward H. Sebesta
unstated. Recasting a politics of white superiority as a Celtic nationalism committed to
preserving the ancient Celtic culture and attaining a homeland territory enabled
adherents to rearticulate their beliefs through well-established political discourses of
cultural protection and the right to self-determination. As claims to whiteness have
become the preserve of overtly racist political groups, we maintain that discourses of
Celtic culture and identity made by the LS and LN implicitly appeal to racial
constructions, albeit hidden behind a veil of Celticity. This occurs in much the same
way as ‘discourses of Englishness’, which, Peter Jackson argues, ‘draw on a
construction of ‘‘whiteness’’ that is socially significant, though rarely expressed openly
in public’.32
Multiculturalism in its current form can be used both progressively by some for a
greater stake in society and regressively, to empower dominant sections of the
population via recourse to identifying their supposedly authentic cultural identities
which are deserving of sustenance. One consequence of this is a linguistic convergence
between political left and right in their articulations of culture which is seen primarily, if
not solely, as a product of ethnicity. Progressive agendas and those of the ‘racist right’,
although wholly at odds in their projects and desired outcomes, both ‘infuse the race
or ethnic category with essentialist, and supposedly naturally inherited, character-
istics’.33 Appeals to the ‘right to cultural difference’, therefore, can be used by activists
to reclaim an ethnic identity that is argued to have been struggling against erasure
within homogenizing mainstream doctrines, and to articulate claims to power and
long-subordinated rights to self determination. From here, multiculturalism does not
have to be stretched too far to be used to racialize people, because in popular
assessment,
Identifications with nation-states are built by definitions of peoplehood rooted in concepts of descent.
People who share common cultural attributes are assumed to share a common biological heritage or people
who share a particular line of descent are assumed to hold cultural characteristics in common.34
Rather than direct appeals to race or biology, a multiculturalist discourse can be used by
political activists to appeal to cultures which form the basis of modern political
groupings. The political right, therefore, can reposition themselves as defenders of
culture and heritage, uniting a commitment to the recognition of cultural difference
and distinctiveness with assertions of the need to retain political control. Vindicating
their separatist agendas by appealing to historical ethnic distinctions, the League of the
South and Lega Nord locate their separatist politics within current US and European
political discourses of multiculturalism in which recognition of a diversity of ethnic
and cultural groups is officially promoted. Hague posits that in the United States,
in place of the idea of a ‘melting pot’, pre-eminence is increasingly given to one’s ethnic
identification as defined by genealogy.35 This facilitates and implicitly sanctions
a process of ‘ethnic claims-making’ which, Mitch Berbrier argues, enables ‘new racists’
to represent white supremacist ideology through claims of belonging to an ethnic
group:
new racists argue that if, according to the values of ‘cultural pluralism’ and ‘diversity’, ethnic or racial pride
is legitimate for (other) ethnic or racial minority groups . . . then it is also legitimate for whites.
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This ‘new racist’ discourse in the United States, Berbrier demonstrates, centres on an
appeal to the ‘equivalence’ of all ethnicities and an argument that all cultural heritages
are worthy of preservation.36 Consequently, groups like the LS and LN are ‘taking the
opportunity to construct out of a multiculturalist agenda of tolerance . . . balkanization
and intolerance’;37 and, as Hobsbawm and Kristeva suggest, these nationalist calls to
ancient ethnic identities and enduring cultures are fundamentally exclusionary.38
Claims to culture can be positioned as timeless and unchanging, bounded by ancient
history and genealogical lineage. The LS and LN are organizations that, we suggest,
recognize the strategic political worth of such appeals to Celtic ancestry to recruit
supporters, and may well believe in the historical Celtic culture of the people residing
within the territories they claim as the CSA and Padania. Our intention here is not to
debunk the appeals of LS and LN claims to Celtic pasts, nor show how they are
historically inaccurate. Rather, we argue that these claims to Celtic ancestry are efforts to
use assertion of cultural distinction to reposition the meaning of being white within
contemporary political discourses of multiculturalism in the USA and Italy, and
subsequently to use this to assert a right to political authority and institutional control
over people and territory.
The League of the South
Politically conservative, and advancing what it envisages as an ‘orthodox Christianity’ as
the basis of its policies, the League of the South39 was founded in Alabama in 1994.40
Growing to around 10 000 members by 2002, the organization advocates secession for
15 states: the 11 Confederate states that withdrew from the USA causing the 1861/65
Civil War plus 4 others.41 James Michael Hill, a historian and LS president since the
group’s foundation, explains: ‘The League of the South is a Southern nationalist
organization. It believes in preserving Southern heritage and culture, believes in states’
rights, believes in Southern independence.’42 The League of the South is part of a wider
neo-Confederate movement in the United States which encompasses peripheral groups
such as Free Mississippi and the Southern Party, the more mainstream heritage
organizations Sons of Confederate Veterans (SCV) and United Daughters of the
Confederacy (UDC) and, most infamously, the former leader of the US Senate,
Republican Trent Lott. Neo-Confederate ideology intertwines a range of political
thought, theology and historical interpretation into a call for recognition of a specific
Southern US culture and various assemblages of what that culture means for the control
of people and resources. Many neo-Confederates argue that to uphold this distinctive
‘Southern culture’, secession of the CSA from the United States is necessary. Horwitz, in
his account of current invocations of Confederate heritage in the United States, explains
that central to neo-Confederate ideology is a claim that in the nineteenth century,
North and South went to war because they represented two distinct and irreconcilable cultures, right down
to their bloodlines. White Southerners descended from freedom-loving Celts in Scotland, Ireland and Wales.
Northerners / New England abolitionists in particular / came from mercantile and expansionist English
stock.43
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This understanding of US history, often identified as the ‘Celtic thesis’ of the US South,
originated in scholarly work in the 1970s/1980s by academic historians who became
leaders of the League of the South upon its establishment in 1994, namely James
Michael Hill and Grady McWhiney. Tracing the ancestral connections of people in the
US South to Celtic areas of the British Isles in a series of academic articles and books,
and drawing on the work of cultural geographers such as Terry Jordan,44 McWhiney
and colleagues argued the US South was a distinctively Celtic region with a Celtic
population.45 This enabled proponents to argue that residents of the southern United
States embodied a different culture from that of the northern states, and that ‘the
American Civil War was basically a continuation of the centuries-old conflict between
Celts and Englishmen’.46
Assertions of the Celtic thesis were widely reported, attracting comment in the mass
circulation magazine Newsweek .47 Academic debate, challenge and criticism followed,
ultimately resulting in rejection of the Celtic thesis as ‘ten years insistence on the
selfsame deductions from untenable premises’.48 In their accounts, McWhiney, Hill and
their colleagues were inconsistent in the identification of regions and peoples of
Europe as being ethnically and culturally Celtic. The US historian Rowland Berthoff, for
example, rejected the ‘expanded concept of a perdurable Celticness’, used by
proponents of the Celtic thesis, arguing in 1986 that McWhiney’s definition of Celtic
‘follows no known usage’.49 Other academic critics also noted that advocates for the
Celtic thesis conceived of culture in much the same manner as nineteenth-century racial
taxonomists. Sheehan, for example, commented that the writing of future LS president
Hill ‘smacks strongly of pseudo-scientific Victorian notions of ‘‘races’’ and ‘‘racial
characteristics’’’.50 Despite such challenges, in the late 1980s the right-wing conserva-
tive organization the Rockford Institute reiterated the contention that the US South was,
and implicitly is, Celtic in its Chronicles magazine.51 LS authors suggest, therefore, that
Celts constitute a stateless people whose efforts to establish nation-states have been
consistently thwarted by superior imperial powers. Roman, British and federal US
Union troops defeated Celtic aspirations in what McWhiney identifies as the ‘three
climatic battles in Celtic history: Telamon [225 BC, Italy], Culloden [1746, Scotland] and
Gettysburg [1863, Pennsylvania]’.52 This lengthy history of Celtic peoples adds weight to
LS demands that self-determination is overdue. These contentions form the basis of LS
insistence that the US south is a Celtic homeland in which Celtic culture comprises
‘core’ elements of CSA national culture. Michael Hill explains:
[T]he present-day South is the remnant of a nation built on the realities of place and kin that we must
revitalise to the best of our abilities. At its core is a European population, especially Anglo-Celts, that must
be preserved as the dominant majority.53
In LS political discourse, ‘Anglo-Celts’ refers to English speaking people of Celtic
ancestry, as director of the LS Mississippi chapter Barry Reid McCain clarifies:
The Anglo prefix merely signifies use of the English language, a useful classification because there are still
several native Celtic languages that have survived into modern times. While Anglo-Celt can apply to many
people in the British Isles and large parts of the population of various ex-British colonies, it is the [US] South
where Anglo-Celts established a homeland and have retained many of their core cultural traits.54
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Further, on a radio programme broadcast throughout the USA, Hill declared that the US
South was engaged in a cultural struggle, and that ‘the element of Southern culture that
is under assault is what I like to call the white Anglo-Celtic’.55 This Anglo-Celtic culture
is constructed in opposition to what the League envision as the normative US culture,
which, basing their assessments on the tenets of the Celtic thesis, is founded upon
English origins. Consequently, the League of the South can distinguish their
constituency, namely white people exhibiting Anglo-Celtic culture, from other white
people in the US, who are identified as ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and thus constitute a different
ethnicity and culture. In LS reasoning, different cultural groups should each be allowed
political autonomy and self-determination.56 Asserting Anglo-Celtic culture is, there-
fore, a LS strategy to position the white Southern population as culturally distinct from
other white people in the USA, and thus as entitled to residence in and control over a
separate nation-state / the CSA.
The League of the South envision the United States as an imperial power which
exhibits an anti-Christian vulgar and materialist culture, which the LS leadership
considers to be depraved.57 Utilizing a strategy of building support for their secessionist
plans from the bottom upwards, advocating home schooling, peer group education and
local Confederate heritage activism, the LS intend to empower local communities and
thereafter define their own codes of law and morality, severing ties with what they
envision as tyrannical US federal and Supreme Court rulings. Their agenda, much of it
theologically driven, is also strongly patriarchal and heterosexist / topics beyond the
scope of the current article, though important for future analysis. At the basis of the LS
assertions of ‘Anglo-Celtic’ ancestry are assumptions of nativism and white privilege.
Arguing that people of European descent, particularly Anglo-Celts, are at the centre of
southern US culture and population necessarily downplays the presence, impact and
rights of other ethnic groups and peoples in the 15 states claimed by the League as the
CSA. People of Hispanic descent are classified as immigrants and illegally present in the
United States. According to LS director Clyde Wilson, a professor of history at the
University of South Carolina, an independent CSA would not tolerate the presence of
Hispanic people:
In the new Confederacy, unlike the U.S., we wont [sic ] have a bit of difficulty telling the difference between
a citizen and an illegal alien. We can hope that the problem will be easily solved and that Smyrna, Georgia,
and Siler City, North Carolina, will no longer be outposts of Mexico.58
As the non-white population in the United States rises, the struggle over immigration is
simultaneously over the power to control territory and people. The League of the South
envisions their putative nation-state as one where ethnicity and culture avows
citizenship. Full citizenship could not be attained by residency or birth within CSA
territory but, it seems, by ‘Anglo-Celtic’ ancestry. Current US political and economic
structures, responding to the needs of capitalism, have enticed cheap labour to move to
locations like rural North Carolina and Georgia. This labour is typically embodied by
non-white persons participating in low-income employment in industries such as
poultry processing.59 Reacting to these changes, and feeling threatened by the growing
presence and politicization of non-white groups, the LS appeal to the need to protect
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‘Anglo-Celtic’ heritage, namely white superiority and patriarchal, heterosexist authority,
in the face of changing demographics which, in some areas of the southern United
States, will soon see majority non-white populations.
Trying to avoid overtly racist statements, the LS typically proposes that non-white
residents will remain in an independent CSA, but that the status, numbers and rights of
these non-whites will be restricted.60 Consequently, the white population will remain
‘dominant’ and in a position of institutional control:
Blacks make up about a quarter of the South’s population, a demographic fact that cannot be ignored.
Therefore the relationship between Southern whites and Southern blacks must be approached in a realistic
manner, and ‘tribal homelands’ are anything but realistic . . .
Each time the League leadership addresses itself to the issue of race, the policy we advance must be free
of hatred and malice. This has been our position from the start. Though many blacks may be taught to hate
us in their homes and institutions, our response to them must be grounded in Christian charity . . . This does
not mean, however, that we must subscribe to the flawed Jacobin notion of egalitarianism, nor does it mean
that white Southerners should give control over their civilisation and its institutions to another race,
whether it be native blacks or Hispanic immigrants. Nowhere, outside of liberal dogma, is any nation called
upon to commit cultural and ethnic suicide . . .
Let us in the League, then, confidently defend our ethnic, cultural, and religious heritage. After all, we
have as much right to do this as anyone.61
In his analysis Hill envisions a distinction between white and non-white populations in
the southern US states, outlining this as ‘us’ and ‘our’ response to ‘them’ and ‘their’
beliefs. Writing to his supporters in this passage, Hill’s perception of the racially white
composition of LS membership is evident. He recognizes the presence of non-white
people in the southern US states, but notes that this is not grounds for ‘control’ over
cultural and political institutions by groups other than the ‘white Southerners’. Indeed,
to cede power would, for Hill, result in the self-inflicted destruction of white privilege
and power, something which he ascribes to current progressive multiculturalist politics.
Yet, softening his rhetoric, he then appeals to the very same discourses of multi-
culturalism, arguing that the white Anglo-Celtic population who constitute the League
of the South’s membership are merely sustaining their heritage and tradition, something
to which they are as entitled to do as any other cultural group.
One of the problems with current US invocations of cultural rights for all, note
Bulmer and Solomos, is that through appeal to ‘the defence of a given cultural identity’,
the reactionary politician can utilize multiculturalism to assert ‘the superiority of one
group over another’.62 Comments by Hill and other League of the South leaders are
equitable to the ‘separate but equal’ rhetoric of the segregation-era United States. Rather
than brutish white supremacism, however, the League of the South reworks and
repositions whiteness as ‘Anglo-Celtic’ ethnicity, and emphasizes that current Celtic
cultural inheritances in the US South are largely indistinguishable from those of ancient
Celts.63
In the United States, appealing to Celtic ancestry and arguing that it deserves political
recognition and power could attract adherents, particularly white men feeling
threatened by the outcomes of multiculturalist policies, to the League of the South’s
cause. Our analysis of these statements demonstrates how League of the South leaders
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assert the right of white people (again primarily men) to dominate and control people
and territory in a putative Confederate States of America through a conduit of claiming
Celtic cultural heritage. This demand is grounded both in the language of multi-
culturalist discourse, which advocates that all cultural groups are worthy of protection,
and in an assertion that the ‘Anglo-Celtic’ peoples of the proposed CSA have prior claim
to cultural and institutional dominance, partly as a consequence of the antiquity of
Celtic peoples. Claiming Celtic ancestry enables the League of the South to assert that
this ethnicity has long been denied its rightful condition of an independent nation-state
with an autonomous homeland. Having identified the southern US states as the location
where the Celts have ‘established a homeland’, LS officials make claims to control the
area and people in it through an embodied set of cultural rights. In the 1990s it was not
only the League of the South that was claiming Celtic origins as the basis for their
politics of secession. In Italy, the Lega Nord, considerably more successful in elections
than the LS, made similar demands and it is to this we now turn.
The Lega Nord
The Lega Nord64 was founded in 1991, when a number of regional groups combined
under the leader of the Lombard League, Umberto Bossi. A prominent and
controversial figure in Italian politics, Bossi has led the Lega Nord since its establish-
ment. The Lega Nord argues that residents of northern Italy are impinged upon by a
corrupt central government which favours southern Italy and its inhabitants. Bossi’s
rhetoric, skilful at times and overtly racist at others, was initially successful in 1992,
when the Lega Nord received three million votes (8.7 per cent) in national elections.
The party gained further support as a result of the tangentopoli (‘kick-back city’)
scandals of 1992/4 that damaged the credibility of Italy’s main post-Second World War
political parties. The LN subsequently entered government as part of Prime Minister
Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition. Berlusconi managed, however, to play on southern Italian
fears of the Lega Nord’s politics, and effectively prevented the expansion of the Lega
Nord’s appeal. Retreating from government and seeing their support decline, in 1995
the LN repositioned itself by endorsing the secession of ‘Padania’ from Italy and
advocating the rights of people exhibiting Celtic culture and ancestral identities. For the
LN, this interaction between claims to territory and culture is complex because, as
Agnew and Brusa contend, although ‘territory matters crucially to the political
imaginations of the Lega’, from the LN’s perspective, ‘territory defines a culture
associated with a myriad of northern Italian localities rather than a homogeneous
‘‘Padanian’’ culture defining a ‘‘Padanian’’ territory’.65 Thus claims to land that would
constitute Padania intersect with claims to culture, and operate in tandem to reinforce a
sense that the genealogy and geography of Padania are fundamentally intertwined.
A central element in LN political discourse is distinguishing between Padania and the
rest of Italy. Utilizing anachronistic stereotypes of southern Italy, the LN controversially
represents and reproduces anti-southern sentiments. Although this is a major reason for
the growth and political success of the party in northern Italy, it has also resulted in the
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LN being seen as racist and opposed to Italian national unity. Anti-southern sentiment
recurs throughout the LN’s political project, and is manifested in numerous ways. The
most prevalent are the articulations of what the LN argues constitute cultural differences
between northern and southern Italy. Although the LN appeals to a cultural rather than
biological differentiation, Bull argues that this process does, however, have a racist
subtext which attributes negative characteristics to southern Italians (‘mafiosita` ’) and
foreign immigrants.66
According to the LN, economic differences between northern and southern Italy are
consequences of different cultures. Northern Italy, maintain LN leaders, is geographi-
cally close to northern Europe, which supposedly produces a culture built around
a core set of values and behaviours. These include a strong work ethic, entrepreneur-
ship, a spirit of sacrifice, a high propensity to saving money, trust, solidarity, and law-
abiding behaviour. This is referred to by the LN as ‘Lombard neo-Calvinism’, and is
structured wholly in contrast to the alleged cultural traits of southern Italy, which
is consistently portrayed by the LN as an area in which people have no desire to work
and are interested only in claiming state benefits.67 For example, a LN local councillor
argued:
The mentality of the people of the North is distinct to that of the South. In the North there is a strong work
ethic which could be described as almost Calvinistic in nature. In spite of the high levels of taxation and the
burden of the South, Lombardy is still one of the wealthiest regions within the European Union (EU).
However, the South of Italy has a ‘‘Mediterranean’’ work ethic, which is based on corruption, a reliance on
state transfers and a more relaxed attitude towards work.68
The LN thus positions southern Italy as ‘other’ and as a metaphor for all Italy’s socio-
economic problems. Although such explanations clearly elide the realities of socio-
economic differences between northern and southern Italy, these LN discourses remain
powerful and are advocated by party supporters and activists as correct interpretations
of contemporary Italy. To justify Padanian secession from Italy, LN leaders argue that
the Italian state has undergone a process of ‘southernization’ since its creation in 1871.
Within LN reasoning, today’s Italian identity is actually a southern Italian identity, and is
founded upon the supposedly southern values and ‘Mediterranean’ attitudes which the
LN rejects. Consequently, the LN’s anti-southern rhetoric rejects Italian nationality,
enabling the justification of a different and separate Padanian national identity. This
Padanian cultural distinctiveness is argued to need protection from the homogenizing
Italian state and its imposition of a singular national culture. Oneto and Pagliarini, for
example, argue that the Lega Nord’s nationalist campaign is primarily a cultural struggle
to maintain Padanian identity and heritage, which are supposedly threatened by the
practices of the Italian nation-state:
All of the expressions of the culture of the peoples of Padania are subject to a process of homogenization
and a marked Italianization. This is a systematic attempt to break down all of the aspects of our ancient
culture, languages, traditions, way of life and institutions. This process is accentuated by people from the
south of Italy working in the public administration and schools of Padania. Above all, on the radio and
television, southern Italian languages are spoken and only with independence can the peoples of Padania
live in complete freedom with their own culture and traditions.69
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Claims to cultural difference and protection are used by the LN, therefore, to legitimate
northern Italy as distinct from the rest of the peninsula. Padania and its residents argue
LN proponents do not share with other Italians origins, traditions, dialects, cultures
or genealogies. Rather, like the League of the South, Celts are identified as a
major ancestral group upon which current claims to Padanian cultural difference are
founded:
[T]hroughout its history [Padania] has always been able to maintain its freedom and autonomy. First it was
the original Lega Lombarda that fought against Frederico Barbarossa and then against Frederico II. We can
say that the true unifying force of the people of Padania has been the desire to defend their difference,
liberty and autonomy. Padania exists and it is strong and cohesive because it is driven by the ancient
aspiration for autonomy, which stems from the demands of its first inhabitants the Celts, the Ligurians and
the Venetians to be free.70
This quotation, originally on the Lega Nord website, was co-written by Gilberto Oneto,
one of the LN’s central voices in its campaign to make ethno-territorial claims to
northern Italy. Oneto is also responsible for national identity in Padania’s so-called
governo sole (sun government) and leads the Libera Compagnia Padana (LCP /
Campaign for a Free Padania).71 The LCP promotes and diffuses awareness of Padanian
culture and identity by organizing meetings, cultural events and publications such as
the twice-monthly journal Quaderni padani (Padanian updates). Oneto’s attempts to
promote recognition of the historic Celtic residents of Padania are a component in the
LN’s plan to distinguish culturally between northern and southern Italy on the basis of
cultural inheritance and genealogy:
All the peoples of Padania descend from the same original ancestors, which can be categorized into three
principal groups / the first and the oldest are the Ligurians; the second group are the Celts and the
Venetians, which come from diverse areas but have similar cultures and traditions; and the third group are
the Goths, the Longobards and all the other Germanic peoples that inhabited the North of Italy. In contrast,
the ancestors of the Italians are the Etruscans and the Greeks, which were the dominant cultures of the
Italian peninsula.72
Oneto and Pagliarini appropriate Celtic peoples as some of Padania’s earliest
inhabitants to legitimize their claims about cultural differences between northern and
southern Italy. These claims are given historical depth and are bolstered by the
assertion that Italy has always been ethnically and culturally divided in this manner.
Extending this historical claim into the present, these LN supporters argue that residents
of the territory they identify as Padania share a common ancestry, implying that
residents of this region who do not share these northern European ancestors are not
legitimate residents of the region, or at least are not its principal inhabitants.73
LN rhetoric and claim to Celtic ancestry serves not only to extenuate Padania’s alleged
cultural difference from Italy but also to draw a distinction between Padanians and
other residents of Italy. Not only does this include those whom the LN believes are
descended from Etruscans and Greeks, namely southern European/Mediterranean
ancestors, but also non-white immigrants. Assertion of Padania’s Celtic and Germanic
genealogies is an implicit affirmation of a racially white population as the basis of
Padanian culture and identity; and as in the US South, where political economic
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restructuring has stimulated anti-immigrant rhetoric from the LS, so too is anti-
immigrant sentiment becoming a dominant theme in LN right-wing populist political
discourse.74 The LN are particularly concerned by the growing presence in Padania of
extracomunitari , ‘who originate from certain parts of the world, particularly Arabs from
the Middle East and Magrebians’, whom, Bossi and Vimercati are convinced, ‘do not
have the least intention of integrating and accepting our customs’.75 Stressing the
importance of maintaining the social and cultural integrity of northern Italy, the LN
argue that Padania is under threat from both southern Italian immigrants and also from
people migrating from outside the EU. According to the LN, extracomunitari
immigration has created a set of problems which undermine Padania’s supposedly
homogeneous culture and social cohesion. As a LN local councillor explained:
The problem is that the extracomunitari often enter Italy illegally and cannot gain legal employment so
they often they get involved in crime, drugs and prostitution. The people are not racist but the problem is
that the immigrants are coming at a time when the Italian economy is in trouble and so there are not
enough jobs for all the Italians, let alone the foreigners.76
In much the same manner as LS leader Michael Hill envisages the distinctive ‘white
Anglo-Celtic’ culture of the US South to be under attack from the growing presence and
rights of non-white residents and their representatives, the LN sees Padanian culture as
threatened by people practising different cultures. Also similarly, the Lega Nord stresses
the centrality of maintaining the cultural integrity of Padania in its nationalist rhetoric.
At the basis of LN assertions of ethno-cultural autonomy, therefore, is a belief in the
inherent right, conferred by prior residence and innate superiority of a supposedly
ancient cultural group, to power and control over territory and other people, namely
immigrants and southern Italians. By portraying southern Italians and extracomunitari
as culturally distinct, not just currently but throughout history, the Lega Nord, in a
manner similar to the LS, positions white, native residents of Padania at the ‘core’ of
society in northern Italy.
Claiming to be Celtic: whiteness and multiculturalism
Theorists of nationalism have long recognized the use of culture in the strategies of
nationalist activists to facilitate supposedly ancient connections between a people and a
specific territory, an intersection of genealogy and geography. Nationalist leaders
typically assert that a culturally defined group of people can be identified, that these
people have a right to self-determination and that this self-determination must be
spatial, the self-determining people having a legitimate right to control a particular
territory.77 It is precisely such claims that are used by the LS and LN to assert control
over certain territories and their inhabitants, which are then justified by reference to
ethnic ancestors and cultural rights. ‘[C]ommonsense discourse about cultures’, argues
Tariq Modood, ‘assumes each culture has a unique, fixed essence that can be grasped
independently of context or intercultural relations, and which makes an ethnic group
act the way it does’.78 The LS and LN certainly propose essentialized understandings of
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transcendental Celtic cultures within their political strategies, proposing that the
permanence and endurance of these cultures since pre-modern times generates
legitimacy for separatism.
LS and LN claims to Celtic origins developed in the 1990s during periods of
demographic change in the southern United States and northern Italy, when and where
immigrants and non-white ethnic minorities were gaining political rights and changing
existing structures of power. Leaders of both the LS and LN made statements opposing
immigration and promoting nativist claims to territory and power. Declaring Celticness
as a primary genealogical identity in the CSA and Padania implicitly subordinates other
ethnic groups. Despite their differing contexts, both the Lega Nord and the League of
the South nationalist movements engage in political discourses that construct claims to
cultural and ethnic distinction. Their usages of Celtic culture are synonymous with
privileging a racially white population. As such, these organizations are making
retrograde claims to genealogically and racially defined rights to power, but are doing
so through rhetorical practices common to contemporary multiculturalist discourses,
namely assertion of a ‘right to cultural difference’. For the LS and LN, Celtic culture
provides an attractive and increasingly marketable imagery upon which to recruit
support. That these organizations share a strategy of appealing to Celtic cultural
difference as a basis for their secessionist agendas demonstrates a danger of uncritically
accepting such seemingly progressive political goals as recognition of multiple cultures.
Perhaps most importantly, however, through the utilization of multiculturalist ideas of
cultural rights and protection, this appropriation of Celtic culture facilitates the LS and
LN with the symbolic and discursive resources to demand that their reactionary racist
politics are in fact progressive articulations of heritage and tradition that are worthy of
respect and recognition.
In the late 1980s, in locations such as Yugoslavia and the USSR where states were
collapsing, ‘‘‘old-new’’ national identities’, namely new nationalist politics based upon
seemingly antiquated origins, were being founded upon ‘uncertain genealogies’ and
‘ethno-history’.79 Nationalists engaged in ‘cultural wars’ to demand recognition for
secession, centring upon revered and apparently ancient ethnic identities as a source of
cultural authenticity. Soon after, in the early 1990s, Lega Nord and League of the South
nationalists appealed to Celtic culture and ethnicity to justify their claims to secession
and the control over territory and its occupants. Haylett argues that the end of the
twentieth century marks a period when relationships between whiteness and power,
although still dominant, are shifting and restructuring. For some white people in some
contexts, repositioning within social and political structures is imposed; for example,
working-class whites in the UK have been redefined as ‘socially excluded’ by middle-
class multicultural discourse and economic policy.80 For other whites in other locations,
as Kobayashi and Peake demonstrate in relation to the United States, whiteness remains
the normative identity constructed through popular discourse.81 In our comparison,
members of the LS and LN / both largely middle-class organizations / are working to
reposition themselves by claiming a Celtic past, implicitly asserting whiteness as the
basis of the right to territorial and institutional power. LS and LN leaders strategically
invoke Celtic ethnicity to locate themselves outside the normative whiteness of the USA
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and Italy and thus form a basis upon which to justify claims for self-determination
and secession. Further, this claim to Celtic ethnicity enables LS and LN activists to
reassert cultural distinction and ethnic segregation by claiming the need for cultural
protection.
Multiculturalist discourses and practices of cultural recognition are, on the surface at
least, antithetical to racial categorization in that they are supposed to advocate equality
of rights regardless of ethnicity or race. Yet, the LS and LN are attempting to gain control
over territory, resources and people by strategically advocating cultural distinction and,
thereafter, cultural priority and authority. Critically, the nation-states proposed by these
two organizations would be embodied by ‘dominant’ white populations with
subordinate non-white residents. Again the advantages of claiming Celtic culture
become evident. Unlike ‘whiteness,’ which has a relatively vague spatial referent, Celtic
identities can be placed; definitively located in areas of northern and central Europe.82
Archaeological artifacts and historical documents can be invoked to position Celts
spatially and temporally. Both LS and LN nationalist activists locate Celtic peoples as the
prior residents of their proposed autonomous territories of the CSA and Padania. For
these nationalists, because Celts were the primary inhabitants of the territories claimed,
those with Celtic ancestry have prior right to reside within and hold power over these
areas. The appeal to Celtic culture, therefore, enables the LS and LN to reinforce their
whiteness while simultaneously professing to be merely revering their ethnic pasts
which, within multicultural discourses, are worthy of recognition, protection and
celebration.
Recent assessments of the geographies of white identities have stressed the necessity
of recognizing ongoing processes of white privilege and the intersections between
whiteness, the constructions of landscape and claims to power, territory, authority and
morality.83 Such studies demand that geographers propose an antiracist agenda, and
contend that the historical and geographical contexts of claims to racial identities are
critical to understanding the connections between race and place. Critical analyses of
whiteness have demonstrated that this identity is often constituted in relation to other
racial classifications. In our case study, Celtic ethnicity and ancestry is used by LS and
LN to distinguish themselves from other ‘white’ groups in the United States and Italy,
and from non-white residents and immigrants in these states. Further, in a current
political context where direct appeals to whiteness and ‘overt race-connected practices’
are frowned upon,84 an appeal to Celtic ethnicity appears acceptable and can be
justified by utilizing a rhetoric of cultural awareness while simultaneously subverting
political commitments to cultural equity and reasserting white superiority.
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